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STELLINGEN  
BEHORENDE BIJ HET PROEFSCHRIFT 
 
ESSAYS ON BOUNDED RATIONALITY IN EPISTEMIC GAME THEORY 
 
 
DOOR 
 
ANGIE MOUNIR 
 
1. Epistemic game theory places the focus on the reasoning process and the resulting 
choice behaviour of individual players rather than the equilibrium outcome of a 
game. 
 
2. Some deviations from subjective expected utility maximization could be perceived as 
either errors players would want to correct in retrospect or as alternative models of 
rational behaviour.  
 
3. Allowing for the possibility of players assigning small probabilities to the event of 
their opponents making a mistake brings theoretical predictions of the Traveler’s 
Dilemma much closer to experimentally observed outcomes.  
 
4. Algorithms characterizing epistemic concepts might lend themselves to 
reinterpretation as actual reasoning steps players go through in the process of making 
a choice in a given game.  
 
5. It is reasonable to think of players as forming beliefs about their own future actions. 
 
6. Common belief in p-belief in rationality is a special case of common belief in  
F-rationality. 
 
7. Reference dependent utility can explain why a seller on eBay would add a “Buy It 
Now” option to his auction. 
 
8. Choices that players could be expected to make under Common Belief in Reference-
Dependent Rationality with the extent of loss aversion being private information are 
exactly those that survive Iterated Elimination of Börger- dominated Choices. 
 
9. “Don’t let us forget that the causes of human actions are usually immeasurably more 
complex and varied than our subsequent explanations of them.” ― Fyodor 
Dostoyevsky, The Idiot, translated by Constance Garnett 
 
10. “PhD life is like a second childhood with more consciousness and financial 
independence” ― Gergely Csapó 
